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Background. A competitive national health insurance system was introduced in Israel 
in 1995. Consumer mobility has been traditionally a signal of market (managed) 
competition. However, since 1998, the sickness funds’ switching rate has been stable 
at around 1% of the population. This low switching rate is explained by limited real 
options, similarity in the sickness funds’ functioning, and reluctance to change 
providers.     
Objective. The objective of the paper is to characterize the 1% of the population who 
switches in relation to the stayers in their age-sex groups in their sickness fund of 
origin, and to examine the implications on public policy.  
Method. We used the National Insurance Institute Health Registry of the years 1999-
2000 to compare selected socio-demographic characteristics of the switchers to those 
of the stayers.    
Results. Switching is rare in older age groups. Within age-sex groups, relatively poor 
persons are more likely to switch than others, and older movers are relatively poorer. 
Overall, disabled persons are less likely than others to switch sickness funds, but in 
certain sub-populations, disabled persons are more likely than others to do so.   
Conclusions. The 1% of switchers does not form a random draw from the age-sex-
adjusted population. The over-representation of poor – and, in some population 
groups, disabled persons – is unique to the Israeli scene. It might be the result of 
demand-side initiatives, but also raises concern that the observed switching pattern 
may result from implicit “risk-export” exercised by the sickness funds under the 
Israeli incomplete age-based risk-adjustment system.    
 
 




The importance of the question: “who switches?” 
 
3






        
       Table 1   
        
 
Percent leaving their sickness funds by age and gender 
        
       Table 2  The ratio of mean income of movers and of stayers          
       Table 3  The ratio of the percent of persons with income support among 
movers   and among stayers 
 
       Table 4  The ratio of the percent of persons with unemployment benefit 
among movers and among stayers 
 
       Table 5  The ratio of the percent of persons with disability benefit among 






  On January 1
st 1995, a National Health Insurance Law was enacted in Israel. 
The Law defined a uniform package of services to be provided by the four sickness 
funds operating nation-wide in Israel. It envisioned a managed competition scheme, 
whereby the sickness funds compete on the quality of services as well as on some 
“extras”, to attract consumers. Unlike the case in the Dutch or the German system, 
Israelis do not pay member fees directly to their sickness funds, so competition on 
price is not relevant. Under the law, health care is universal, and no (explicit) risk 
selection is allowed. Furthermore, open enrollment with an annual switching option is 
specified. Since 1998 the sickness funds are allowed to offer voluntary community-
rated supplementary insurance policies to their members (only), which cover acute 
care services not covered by the package of benefits (such as alternative medicine, 
more physical therapy sessions, medicines not in the package, choice of surgeon etc.). 
These policies have become a major service on which sickness funds compete.  
The incomes of the sickness funds consist of governmental transfers, insurees’ 
co-payments, and supplemental insurance premiums. The governmental transfers 
include the age-based risk-adjusted capitation payments, complemented by a five 
severe conditions-specific risk sharing (Aids, Thalasemia major, Gauche, Hemophilia 
and End-stage renal disease). Partly as a result of the capitation payments to the 
sickness funds, the cost per age-standardized member has converged across the funds 
(for further details on the Israeli system see Shmueli, Chernichovsky and Zmora 
[1]).  
As envisioned by the managed competition scheme, it was expected that some 
level of consumer mobility would be observed. Consumer mobility is traditionally 




care and of service. During the first three years of the law, about 4% of the total 
population switched sickness funds annually (switching does not include newborns, 
deaths, or first registration of new immigrants). This figure reflected two factors: first, 
the sickness funds began aggressive marketing campaigns to sign on members (e.g. in 
malls and bus stations). Second, the law cancelled previously established effective 
restrictions on switching. Before 1995, two sickness funds exercised risk selection, 
and a third sickness fund was the only option available to certain parts of the 
population because of socio-political affiliation or geographical location. All those 
who had wished to switch but could not do that previously, materialized their wish 
during the first years after 1995. Since January 1
st, 1998, the intention to switch 
sickness funds must be registered in a Post Authority office, and the annual rate of 
switchers has been quite fixed at 1%. 
  The reasons for the low switching rates in Israel (and in Belgium and the 
Netherlands as well) are discussed, in a five countries comparative context, by Laske-
Aldershof et al. 
[2]. The conclusions are that, abstracting from reasons commonly 
associated with inertia, status quo bias, and reservation from changes, the limited 
choice options facing the Israeli population reduces the potential net benefits of 
switching, leading to low mobility. The limited choice setting results from the 
essential similarities across the four sickness funds, both in the basic and the 
supplementary insurance domains.  
All four Israeli sickness funds operate as managed care organizations. The 
biggest sickness fund, with a 56% market share in 2000, operates like a staff-model 
HMO, owns eight general hospitals and provides most of its primary and secondary 
care by means of salaried physicians in its clinics. The small funds (market shares of 




independent physicians and institutions for acute care. Many independent physicians 
and most hospitals contract with more than one sickness fund.  
An additional possible barrier to consumer mobility among Israeli sickness 
funds has been the waiting period imposed on new buyers of supplemental insurance 
policies. Consequently, switching sickness fund bears transaction costs in the 
supplemental insurance market as well, which further reduce the net potential benefits 
of mobility.    
The present paper focuses on the question of who are those who are more 
likely than others to switch sickness funds in Israel, and infers the implications for the 
Israeli system.   
 
The importance of the question: “who switches?” 
Some may argue that an annual rate of 1% switchers is too low to justify a 
concern about who are the switchers. We believe that the issue is important, and 
perhaps even more so precisely because of the low rate of switching, for several 
reasons. First, due to the very skewed distributions of health, medical expenditure and 
income, and the strong correlations among them, a 1% of the population who switches 
sickness funds might concentrate much larger shares of health, income or medical 
care costs. Second, as mentioned above, competition among the sickness funds can be 
effective if consumers search and compare options. In order for public policy to 
spread information and to enhance switching efficiently, the identity of the (non) 
switchers must be known. Third, switching behavior might affect the quality of care 
offered by the sickness funds. If, for instance, older and sicker persons are less 
inclined to switch than others, sickness funds may find it unprofitable to invest in high 




who are more likely than others to switch. Finally, switching behavior is important for 
risk adjustment. Risk adjustment aims to make the sickness funds indifferent with 
respect to the insurees’ level of risk and expected costs as well as to the quality of 
care of different services. Thus, with reference to the example just given, risk 
adjustment should search to neutralize such distorting incentives.       
  Generally, three types of switches among sickness finds can be identified. The 
first type consists of technical switching.  These switches are the result of other, 
mostly exogenous, decisions. For example, one may switch sickness funds because of 
moving to another city or region. Technical switches are expected to concentrate in 
young ages and to be random in a cross-section. The second type of switch reflects 
choices made by individuals based on their preferences vis-à-vis the different 
attributes of the optional sickness funds. These are the classical consumer choice 
cases. The attributes may include price (not relevant in the Israeli system, as 
mentioned above), waiting times for appointments, accessibility of specialist services, 
administrative complexity, proximity of providers and other determinants of the 
quality of services. Different bundles of attributes may appeal to different personal 
characteristics such as level of education, income, family composition, or age. Most 
of the studies have focused on these switches, including the estimation of price 
elasticities 
[3-5]. These switches reflect consumers’ free choice and serve as an 
incentive for lower price and better quality of care and service. Earlier studies 
generally found that younger age groups, healthier, more educated and richer persons 
were more likely than others to switch sickness funds/health plans. We reiterate that 
price sensitivity has been an importance factor in all those studies and that the present 




The third type of switch includes those related directly to health state and to 
the level of expected medical expenditure. These switches might be initiated by the 
individual, searching for e.g., better quality or quantity of services and care, a reason 
which appeals more to sick individuals than to the young and healthy. This is a 
demand-side factor, which is a variant of adverse selection. They might, however, be 
the result of the sickness funds’ strategy, namely, (implicit) risk selection activities to 
induce sick individuals to leave, facing an incomplete risk-adjustment scheme.  
From a societal perspective, and from a risk-adjustment point of view, the 
third type of switch is the most interesting one. However, it is the most difficult to 
analyze, since information on health status and expected and actual expenditure is 
needed. Either as an adverse selection or risk selection act, such switches reduce 
welfare, since they distort the incentives for high quality care for sick persons and 
might cause financial difficulties to certain plans.  
 
Data and methods 
We use information from the National Insurance Institute’s Central Health 
Registry for the years 1999-2000, which contain selected personal characteristics on 
all Israeli residents by their sickness fund, including an identification of the switchers. 
In particular, we focus on the following personal characteristics in relation to 
switching behavior: age, gender, wage, employment status, and whether or not the 
individual receives income support, disability, or unemployment benefits. We note 
that the receipt of the above benefits stops at retirement age (in the above years: age 
60 for women and 65 for men), when they are replaced by old-age benefits.  
With respect to each of the above personal traits, in each sex-age group in the 




personal trait under discussion (e.g., the percent receiving disability benefit). The 
totals were calculated as weighted averages of the group specific rates.  
We tested statistically these ratios by testing the equality of the 
means/proportions between movers and stayers. A t-test was used to test the equality 
of mean incomes, and chi-square tests were used to test the equality of the proportions 
receiving income support, disability, or unemployment benefits.  
 
Results       
Table 1 presents the percent switching sickness fund in the years 1999 and 
2000 by age and gender (the column on the far right presents the size of the age 
groups in the population in November 1999). The overall rate is 1%, which has been 
stable during the period since 1998. The mobility rates are quite similar among men 
and women in most age groups. Particularly high rates are found in age groups 15-34 
and 0-4. These switches are probably technical, of young singles and couples with 
small children. The propensity to move declines steadily with advanced age. Among 
the 75+ elderly, only 0.3% switched sickness fund in 2000. Although the rates differ 
across the four sickness funds, this pattern is seen in all of them.  
Additional general findings (not presented in Table 1) indicate that while the 
mean age of the insured population was 32 in 2000, the mean age of movers was 26. 
It is interesting to note that in the two “older” sickness funds the mean age of leavers 
was higher than that of joiners, while in the other two the opposite was found. This 
finding implies that in the long run, switching sickness funds is going to change the 
age structure of the four sickness funds, rendering it more uniform.  
Table 2 presents the mean labor-income of switchers relative to the stayers’ by 




both men and women, switchers have about 20% lower wages than do the stayers. 
With advanced age, the switchers have relatively lower wages than do those in 
younger age groups. For example, in 1999, the mean wage among movers in the 35-
44 age group was 95% of the mean among stayers, while in the 65-74 age group the 
proportion was only 60%. A similar pattern was found in all sickness funds. In most 
of the cells, the ratio of the movers’ wages to the stayers’ wages was significantly 
smaller than one. Only in the 15-24 age groups – and among men in particular – are 
movers richer than stayers. A similar picture appears among the self-employed 
(because of small cells we combined the upper age groups into 45+).   
The findings that the switchers were poorer than average and that the gap 
increased with age are confirmed by Table 3. In 1999, the rate of income support 
recipients among switchers was 1.4 times the rate among stayers (the rate of recipients 
in the population was 2.3%). In 2000, the ratio was 1.19 (and the rate in the 
population was 2.48%). This ratio increased with age in both years and among men 
and women. For example, it was 1.56 in 1999 in the 25-34 age group, and reached 
2.01 in the 55-65 age group. All ratios are significantly larger than 1.  
Table 4 shows that the relative rate of unemployment benefit recipients among 
movers was around 1 (and not significantly different from 1) in 1999 (the population 
rate was 1.52%), and well (significantly) above 1 in all cells except two in the year 
2000 (the population rate was 1.34%). For the entire population, for example, the ratio 
was 1.27.   
Finally, Table 5 presents the relationship between switching and the receipt of 
disability benefit. Overall, the rate of recipients of disability benefit among movers 
was 0.73 and 0.63 the rate among stayers, in 1999 and 2000 respectively (the rates in 




individuals were less likely than others to switch. However, the ratio increased 
somewhat with age in both years and among both men and women. In particular, it 
was larger than one in 1999 in the age group 35-54. In one sickness fund, the 1999 
overall ratio was 1.46, and in all age groups the ratio was higher than one, reaching 
2.76 in the 45-54 age group. In another sickness fund, the ratio was greater than one 
for ages above 25. The 2000 figures were similar.         
 
Discussion     
The results indicate that while only about 1% of the population switches 
sickness funds in Israel yearly, the switchers are far from being a random draw from 
the population with respect to several important characteristics.   
The tendency to switch is highest among young (ages up to 34) singles and 
couples with small children. Part of these moves is probably technical (e.g., as a result 
of switching to a larger apartment), part of them reflects consumers’ choices and may 
have originated from a search for better quality or availability of pediatric or 
gynecological care. Still another part of these moves might have responded to 
selective marketing favorable risk selection by (some or all) the sickness funds, trying 
to attract young children. Children represent a predictable profit under the present 
capitation formula, due to the over-paying rate for that age group.  
A similar argument might explain the higher switching rates found among 
Arabs, who have typically more children than do (secular) Jews. Arab residents, with 
(on average) relatively bigger families, worse health, and lower incomes have been 
historically concentrated with one (the biggest) sickness fund, as a result of risk 
selection by the other funds. With the introduction of the national health system in 




relatively higher switching rates. The over-paying risk-adjusted rate for children made 
young Arab families particularly attractive. 
A lower tendency of elderly persons to switch sickness funds was found in 
Germany, the US and the Netherlands as well 
[3-5]. This is a result of higher 
transaction costs of switching, including the effort needed to retrieve information and 
the discomfort of changing physicians.     
Poor persons (with low wages, and/or receiving income support or 
unemployment benefit) are over-represented among the switchers. Furthermore, that 
over-representation increases with age, at least among wage-earners. This means that 
switching sickness funds is largely an inferior good. This is inconsistent with other 
studies’ results suggesting that switching is a normal good.  
Poor persons’ switches are hardly expected to be technical moves. They are 
also not a result of higher price-elasticity, since there is no price competition on the 
premium in Israel. Co-payments are approximately equal across sickness funds as 
well, so that a search for lower co-payments can hardly be a reason to move (in 
addition, recipients of income support and disability benefit were exempted from 
paying co-payments).    
One possible demand-side explanation is the lower ownership rate of 
supplemental insurance among poor persons 
[6]. As was mentioned earlier, newcomers 
who buy supplemental insurance must bear a waiting period, which is expected to 
discourage moves. The lower ownership rate thus reduces the transaction costs of 
moving for poor persons. Another demand-side explanation might be that among rich 
persons, the particular sickness fund one chooses is of little importance, since in any 




Another type of explanation for the higher propensity to move among poor 
persons lies in the correlation between income and health. It is well known that in 
Israel, as in other countries, poor persons are sicker than rich persons, and use more 
health services 
[7]. The over-representation of the poor among switchers may thus 
reflect a higher tendency to move among sick individuals. These might be health-
related moves of the third type mentioned above. While the literature concludes that 
the likelihood to move is lower among sick persons because of the high transaction 
costs of switching, originating from their greater involvement with both the 
administrators and providers of care (e.g. Strombom et al. 
[4]), sick persons are 
expected to be more sensitive than others to the quality, availability and quantity of 
the care they receive. They are also more knowledgeable on the quality of services 
because of their greater use of services. If they feel that they are being under-served, 
they might switch to another sickness fund, where they hope to find more and better 
care.   
While such a switch among sick persons might reflect a rational demand-side 
move, that under-serving may have resulted from strategic implicit selection and 
skimping activities on behalf of the sickness funds, in light of the incomplete risk 
adjustment scheme. Under the Israeli age-based risk adjustment scheme, sick persons 
of any age are predictable losses, and “exporting” them to another sickness fund is 
likely to be profitable. Furthermore, in advanced age, mean health deteriorates and 
expected medical care costs increase, but the difference in mean costs between sick 
and healthy elderly diminish 
[8]. Consequently, in advanced age groups, persons who 
represent significant losses are sicker, relative to the age group mean, than in younger 




are identified as poorer relative to the stayers and the age group mean than in younger 
age groups.  
The results show that in general, persons receiving disability benefit are less 
likely than others to switch sickness funds. Since disability and poor health and use of 
services are positively related, this finding is consistent with previous research 
[3-5]. 
However, the results indicate that this is true only for the population as a whole. In the 
35-54 age group and in two sickness funds, disabled persons are over-represented 
among the switchers. Possible reasons for such findings are similar to the ones 
discussed above with respect to poor – and sick – persons being over-represented 
among the switchers. Namely, disabled persons may have felt that they were under-
served in their sickness fund and switched in hope to receive more appropriate care.  
Such under-serving might have resulted from implicit risk-selection. As an 
illustration of the working of such selection, we note that the sickness fund with the 
highest (consistently across all age groups and in both years) over-representation of 
disabled persons among the switchers contracts independent physicians to provide 
primary and secondary care. These independent physicians largely run solo-practices 
in their own homes or in rented apartment-clinics, with no special accessibility 
arrangements for disabled persons. Disabled persons are thus forced to switch 
providers – and often sickness fund – in order to gain physical accessibility to clinics. 
Since disabled persons of all ages, are – under the Israeli risk-adjustment scheme – 
predictable losses, that particular sickness fund profits from the implicit risk selection.       
 
Conclusions 
  Switching sickness funds is rare in Israel. About 1% of the population switch 




effective in providing incentives for good quality of care and services. Public policy 
should remove barriers to move, and assure the dissemination of relevant information. 
Barriers to move include the terms of supplementary health insurance offered by the 
sickness funds.  
The main observation of the present study is that in Israel, unlike in other 
systems, poor persons are more likely than others to switch. While several demand-
side explanations can be offered, one cannot rule out the possibility that because of 
incomplete age-based risk-adjustment system, the poor – who are sicker than average 
in all age groups – are predictable losses, and their higher switching rates result from 
implicit risk-selection. On the other hand, young children are predictable profits, and 
thus favorably selected (attracted) by the sickness funds, inducing again high 
switching among them and their young parents. Public policy should improve the 
risk-adjustment system, in order to provide incentives to the sickness funds to 
differentiate themselves as proving good quality care to all, including those sicker 
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Table 1: Percent leaving their sickness funds by age and gender  
             
1999 2000 
Age group  Total Men  Women  Total Men Women 
N (000) 
(Nov 1999) 
Total    1.01 0.99  1.02  1.04 1.03  1.05  6281 
0-4  1.39 1.37  1.41  1.46 1.44  1.47  641 
5-14  0.85 0.86  0.85  0.91 0.92  0.91  1182 
15-24  1.88 1.73  2.02  1.71 1.53  1.86  964 
25-34  1.37 1.40  1.34  1.45 1.52  1.39  941 
35-44  0.73 0.73  0.74  0.82 0.86  0.79  791 
45-54  0.49 0.44  0.53  0.57 0.54  0.60  713 
55-64  0.45 0.41  0.49  0.52 0.45  0.57  422 
65-74  0.37 0.35  0.38  0.42 0.40  0.43  352 
75+  0.23 0.22  0.23  0.28 0.25  0.30  275 
 
 
Table 2: The ratio of mean income of movers and of stayers 
          
1999 2000 
Age group  Total Men  Women  Total Men  Women 
Employees          
Total    0.78^  0.76* 0.81* 0.79*  0.80* 0.79* 
15-24 1.06*  1.07*  1.06*  0.96#  1.03*  0.95* 
25-34  0.93*  0.92* 0.93* 0.96*  0.94* 0.93* 
35-44  0.95*  0.94* 0.96* 0.88*  0.88* 0.88* 
45-54  0.91*  0.92* 0.90* 0.82*  0.81* 0.85* 
55-64  0.86*  0.84* 0.89* 0.74*  0.74* 0.75* 
65+ 0.60*  0.55*  0.75#  0.57*  0.56*  0.73* 
          
Self-employed         
Total   0.86*  0.84*  0.91*  0.88*  0.85*  1.08# 
15-24 1.17*  1.26*  1.04#  0.68*  0.75*  0.57* 
25-34  0.91*  0.89* 1.06# 1.01#  1.00# 1.17# 
35-44  0.97*  0.95* 0.78* 0.89*  0.87* 0.98* 
45+  0.83*  0.81* 1.13# 0.85*  0.76* 1.39# 
________________________________________________________ 
* The ratio is different than 1 at p=0.01. 









Table 3: The ratio of the percent of persons with income support among movers and    
among stayers  
         
1999 2000 
Age group  Total  Men Women Total  Men Women 
Total  1.40*  1.40* 1.40* 1.19*  1.16* 1.21* 
18-24  1.38*  1.34* 1.37* 1.29*  1.36* 1.25* 
25-34 1.56*  1.72*  1.47*  1.11*  1.14*  1.09** 
35-44  1.59*  1.65* 1.55* 1.41*  1.40* 1.43* 
45-54  2.23*  2.11* 2.24* 1.70*  1.74* 1.65* 
55-65  2.01*  2.22* 1.92* 1.71*  1.60* 2.04* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*   The ratio is greater than 1 at p=0.01 one-side chi-square test. 
** The ratio is greater than 1 at p=0.10 one-side chi-square test. 
 
 
Table 4: The ratio of the percent of persons with unemployment benefit among movers and 
among stayers  
            
1999 2000 
Age group  Total Men Women Total  Men Women 
Total   0.99#  0.93#  1.05#  1.27*  1.26*  1.28* 
18-24 0.75#  0.60#  0.89#  1.26*  1.29*  1.23* 
25-34 0.97#  0.96#  0.99#  1.20*  1.11*  1.29* 
35-44 1.10#  1.11#  1.09#  1.16*  1.31*  1.00# 
45-54 1.17**  1.22#  1.14#  1.33*  1.49*  1.19# 
55-65 1.00#  1.14#  0.86#  1.29*  1.37*  1.52* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*    The ratio is greater than 1 at p=0.01 one-side chi-square test. 
**  The ratio is greater than 1 at p=0.10 one-side chi-square test. 
#    The hypothesis that the ratio equals 1 cannot be rejected at p=0.01. 
 
 
Table 5: The ratio of the percent of persons with disability benefit among movers and 
among stayers  
           
1999 2000 
Age group  Total Men  Women  Total Men Women 
Total 0.73*  0.75*  0.71*  0.63*  0.63*  0.63* 
up to 24  0.76*  0.80**  0.73*  0.64*  0.63*  0.68* 
25-34 0.99#  1.06#  0.88#  0.65*  0.63*  0.68* 
35-44 1.13*  1.30*  0.95#  1.00#  1.01#  0.97# 
45-54 1.33*  1.30*  1.35*  0.90#  0.94#  0.88# 
55-65 0.85*  0.93#  0.80**  0.89**  1.02#  0.79** 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
*    The ratio is different than 1 at p=0.01.  
**  The ratio is different than 1 at p=0.10.  
#    The hypothesis that the ratio equals 1 cannot be rejected at p=0.01. 